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Abstract 
This case study analyses the relationship between European news agencies and the state. On the basis of interviews, 
official documents and secondary sources, we examine recent developments in the relationship with the state in a 
sample of four countries – Finland, France, Poland and Spain – representing different kinds of media systems. While the 
evolution of this relationship has been different and unique in each country, they are all bound by the competition rules 
of the European Union, and the challenges that the agencies face are similar. In general, European news agencies are 
struggling to keep their basic news services profitable. We argue that in the age of fake news and disinformation the 
social and democratic value of these news services is much greater than their economic value to their owners. From the 
democracy perspective, these services can be understood as a public good, and therefore the subsidising of content with 
a high information value can be in the public interest if certain preconditions are met. At the same time, safeguarding the 
editorial, and in particular the structural, independence of the agencies from political control is essential. 
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Introduction 
States can intervene in the functioning of news agencies 
through various structural means. Our report explores 
how the relationship between news agency and state has 
developed in some European countries with regard to: a) 
regulation and governance, b) finance and ownership and 
c) indirect or direct political control. 
These aspects are observed in four country cases: Finland, 
France, Poland and Spain. Common to all four countries is 
that the question of the relationship between the news 
agency and the state has been topical and subject to 
renegotiation in recent years. These countries were 
chosen in order to include various types and sizes of news 
agency and the selection spans different media systems, 
from north to south and east to west in Europe. 
In terms of size, scope and orientation, the news agencies 
chosen for the case study differ greatly from one another, 
reflecting the preconditions set by national histories and 
the size of their home markets. While the French Agence 
France-Presse (AFP) and the Spanish Agencia EFE are 
among the four largest news agencies in the world and 
operate in comparatively large markets on the European 
scale, the Polish Press Agency (PAP) is clearly less 
international than others in orientation, and the Finnish 
News Agency (STT) operates in a small and linguistically 
isolated domestic market.1 In terms of turnover, AFP is 
over twenty times bigger than STT and PAP and almost 
four times the size of EFE.2 
The evolution of the relationship between the media and 
the state has been different and unique in each country 
because of their histories, social and political structures, 
different cultural backgrounds, and the characteristics of 
their media systems. The already classic categorisation 
by Hallin and Mancini (2004) helps us to understand the 
role of the state with regard to the media in general. 
In this classification, France and Spain are both seen as 
representing the Mediterranean or polarised-pluralist 
media model, characterised by the strong role played by 
the state, the close relationship between political actors 
and the media, and an elitist and polarised media field – 
although this last tendency has somewhat diminished in 
recent decades. Although they are grouped as the same 
ideal type in terms of the state’s role, there are underlying 
differences, rooted in their political histories, between the 
                                                        
1 In 2018 the population of France was 65 million, compared to 46 
million in Spain, 38 million in Poland, and only 5.5 million in Finland 
(Worldometers, 2018). Based on GDP, France was the third largest 
economy in the EU, while Spain ranked sixth, Poland tenth and 
Finland sixteenth (International Monetary Fund, 2018).  
2 Based on the agencies’ annual reports and on our interviews, in 
two countries. In France the consolidation of democracy 
led to the development of a strong welfare state similar to 
that of the societies of northern Europe, whereas in Spain 
democratisation took place relatively late and the media 
system has reflected remnants of the authoritarian 
traditions of control of the years of the Franco dictatorship 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
The Polish media field is similarly characterised by strong 
polarisation and by strong institutional connections 
between the media and the state (see e.g. Dobek-
Ostrowska, 2012). Although in some respects, including 
the traditionally low newspaper circulation, the Polish 
media system resembles those of southern Europe, it is 
more of a mixture of the polarised-pluralist and liberal ideal 
types (Hallin & Mancini, 2012a, 2012b; Szynol & Glowacki, 
2011). The high degree of politicisation is combined with 
a strong commercialisation of the media that took place 
after the fall of the Communist regime, and today the 
Polish media market is dominated by foreign media 
groups. However, the far-reaching media reform carried 
out in Poland in the 1990s and aimed at reducing state 
influence in the media sector only partially implemented 
the ’Western’ normative model (Klimkiewicz, 2017) and 
some structural elements inherited from the former 
communist state media have remained resistant to 
change in the CEE countries (Castro Herrero et al., 2017). 
In contrast to the other three countries, Finland represents 
a small welfare state in northern Europe. According to 
Hallin and Mancini (2004), the key characteristics of the 
so-called democratic-corporatist media model include the 
co-existence of political parallelism and journalistic 
professionalism. The role of the state has traditionally 
been an active one, while at the same time providing 
strong protection for press freedom. 
Using the path-dependency approach as a loose analytical 
framework, we take account here of the historical 
structures and seek to understand how the set of 
decisions observed today are affected by decisions made 
in the past that tend to constrain future institutional 
change (Ryfe, 2011; Bannerman & Haggart, 2014). 
However, rather than seeking to compare the situations in 
different countries, this report aims to illuminate the 
different ways in which European news agencies interact 
with the state.  
Despite their many differences, the agencies are currently 
faced with more or less the same challenges. While some 
2017 the turnover of AFP was around 300 million euros, EFE’s was 
77 million euros, PAP’s 13 million euros and STT’s 12 million euros. 
AFP has ca. 2,300, EFE ca. 700, PAP ca. 400 and STT ca. 120 staff 
(AFP, n.d.; Agencia EFE, 2018a; STT, n.d.; interviews with PAP 
management). 
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have been more successful in inventing new business 
strategies in the digital media environment, hardly any of 
the European news agencies have managed to maintain a 
general news service as a profitable business. Also, the 
regulatory framework and the competition rules of the 
European Union, in particular, now set preconditions for 
state support/intervention and thus limit the choices 
available in each member country. 
In the following we first give a brief overview of the 
development of the state relationship in each country. 
After this, we delve into the forms of public funding and 
the governance structures of the agencies, with an 
emphasis on recent changes in the regulatory framework 
at national and EU level. Finally, we make some remarks 
on questions of political (in)dependence and discuss the 
social value of national news agencies from the 
perspective of democracy. 
The analysis is based on 12 semi-structured interviews 
with relevant stakeholders (including news agency 
representatives, state officials, politicians and 
academics), as well as on administrative documents 
(including laws and EU Commission rulings), unofficial 
secondary data (such as media texts) and earlier 
research.3 
The foundations of the state 
relationship 
The foundations of the relationship between news agency 
and state are laid down in the ownership structures and 
legislative framework. Of the four agencies examined here, 
all but the privately owned Finnish STT are subject to 
special legislation. EFE and PAP are publicly owned 
companies, while AFP is ‘an autonomous civil entity 
functioning under commercial rules’.4 
AFP 
The history of AFP can be traced back to the privately run 
Havas agency, founded in 1835, which during the Second 
World War was taken over and converted into a 
propaganda tool (renamed French Information Office) for 
the Vichy government. The French news agency was 
reconstituted in 1944 as a state enterprise providing 
services for the state and mostly dependent on its funds 
(see e.g. Kuhn, 2011, p. 145.) From the beginning, AFP’s 
existence has been marked by a conflict of different 
                                                        
3 In France, Poland and Spain, we conducted interviews with one 
or two news agency representatives as well as with a local media 
researcher from each country. In Finland, the interviewees 
included the Minister of Communication and one of her 
subordinates, a member of parliament and two media 
professionals, one of whom is a member of STT’s board. 
interests: while the French press was primarily concerned 
to establish a national news agency, the Ministry of 
Foreign and Colonial Affairs was keen to have an 
international agency to disseminate French news abroad. 
The reconciliation of these different interests finally led to 
the formulation of a statute approved by the French 
parliament in 1957, which laid down fundamental 
principles intended to guarantee the agency’s 
independence. In many ways, AFP’s statute is unique of its 
kind. The agency came under the joint control of both the 
French government and the French press, and the statute 
was intended to guarantee its independence from both 
public- and private-sector interference. The sui generis 
status given to the agency makes it neither a state-owned 
nor a commercial entity, which differentiates AFP both 
from other global news agencies operating purely on a 
commercial basis and from those operating under the 
direct control of the governments that finance them. 
The first two articles of AFP’s statute outline the purpose 
and obligations of the agency. Its mission  is ‘to seek out, 
in France as well as abroad, the elements of a complete 
and objective information service’ and ‘to place that 
information at the disposal of users in exchange for 
payment’. In sum, AFP must provide objective, exact, 
impartial and trustworthy information on a regular and 
uninterrupted basis. It is specifically stressed that the 
agency may under no circumstances compromise its 
objectivity or ‘fall under the control, either de facto or de 
jure, of any ideological, political or economic grouping’. 
Also, the global nature of the agency is explicitly 
formulated: in accordance with its mission, AFP is 
expected to provide information not only to French but 
also to foreign users and ‘must to the full extent that its 
resources permit, ensure the existence of a network of 
facilities giving it the status of a worldwide information 
service.’ (Legifrance, 2018; English translation of AFP 
statutes by SOS AFP, 2017.) 
EFE  
Agencia EFE was created in 1939, in the midst of the 
Spanish Civil War, as a communication tool for the 
government, with the purpose of disseminating, to other 
parts of Spain as well as abroad, information favourable to 
the winning army. Hence, EFE was not meant to become 
a profitable enterprise, but was rather created for political 
and patriotic purposes. However, the supporters of Franco 
were well aware of the importance of appearances, which 
is why EFE was not founded as a state agency but as a 
4 In legal form, Agencia EFE is a public (limited) company owned 
by the state holding company SEPI, which in turn is controlled by 
the Ministry of the Treasury. The Polish press agency (PAP) is a 
joint-stock company of which 100 percent is owned by the 
Republic of Poland. In legal form it is a statio fisci (a representative 
of the state, acting on behalf and for the benefit of the state). 
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private company owned by private shareholders (Artero, 
2008, p. 58). For several decades EFE was clearly a 
political instrument of Franco’s dictatorship, but it has 
developed into the fourth largest news agency in the world 
and the leading global news provider in Spanish. 
A royal decree, approved by the Spanish Council of 
Ministers in December 2018, specifies EFE’s obligations of 
public service. These include guaranteeing the 
informational needs of Spanish society and spreading its 
identity and cultural diversity. The agency is expected to 
cover ‘events of special interest for Spain’ and to 
disseminate these to national and foreign media. In 
particular, EFE has the duty cover ‘the activities and trips 
of the Royal Family, the Head of State, members of the 
government, the Cortes Generales [Congress], the 
judiciary and other institutions and organs of the state’. 
Furthermore, EFE is obligated to ‘foster the interchange of 
information within the national territory and to contribute 
to the territorial information balance in Spain’. The agency 
also has an express duty to provide information services 
to the General State Administration. (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado (BOE), 2018.) 
On an international level, EFE has the obligation to ‘further 
the information exchange between Spain and the rest of 
the world and to guarantee the informational presence of 
Spain abroad, in particular in the countries of the European 
Union, the Ibero-American community, the United States 
of America, the Maghreb countries and North Africa and 
Asia.” (BOE, 2018.) The latest formulation expands the 
scope somewhat from the previous formulation in the 
agency’s mission statement of 2015, which emphasised 
the obligation towards the Spanish-speaking world and 
Latin America in particular. The importance given to 
domestic language(s) was also emphasised by the newly 
elected president of EFE, Fernando Garea, in a speech in 
the Spanish Congress (Cortes Generales, 2018):  
I do not think it is necessary to explain how important 
Agencia EFE is, not only for practising the democratic 
right [of citizens] of access to information, but also for 
representing Spain abroad, especially in Latin America, 
and disseminating the Spanish language and co-
official languages Galician, Basque and Catalan. [our 
translation] 
PAP 
The predecessor of the Polish Press Agency (PAP) was the 
Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT), which operated between 
1918 and 1939. The Polish news agency was re-
established in the early 1990s. In a similar manner to AFP 
and EFE, PAP is subject to special legislation, passed in 
                                                        
5 The section of the statute defining the mission of the agency 
1997, which sets out the agency’s mission.  In addition, it 
is governed by the Polish code of commerce.  
As defined in its statute, ‘The Polish Press Agency is a 
public press agency which gathers and provides its 
subscribers with objective and comprehensive 
information from Poland and abroad’. It is ‘obliged to 
communicate the position of the Sejm [lower house], 
Senate [upper house], the President of the Republic of 
Poland and the Council of Ministers’. Furthermore, it is 
stated that ‘the Polish Press Agency enables other leading 
state agencies to communicate their position on 
important state issues’.5  
According to article 2 of the 1997 legislation, “the Polish 
Press Agency must not be controlled neither legally nor 
economically by any ideological, political or economic 
entity”, while the obligation to cover the actions of state 
institutions is clearly expressed in article 1. 
*   * * 
These mission statements clearly reflect both democratic 
goals of providing information crucial to an active citizenry 
and more nationalistic interests and priorities. As 
formulated by Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 120), publicly 
funded news agencies function both to maintain the 
presence of the national press on the world scene and as 
a subsidy to domestic news media that use the service. 
On the international level, both AFP and EFE have a more 
or less clearly articulated task of displaying the nation as 
well as of counterbalancing the otherwise Anglo-Saxon-
dominated world view promoted by the other big 
international news agencies AP and Reuters and by 
international media companies such as the British public 
broadcaster BBC (cf. Kuhn, 2011, pp. 146). In both cases, 
this determination to maintain the agency’s position 
among the major global news distributors seems to reflect 
the imperialist legacies of former world powers. Although 
both are competitive actors across international media 
markets, EFE has traditionally had a clearly emphasised 
duty towards Latin America and AFP has had notably 
strong links with the former French colonies. On top of 
promoting national visions of world news, the strong 
presence in these regions arguably also aims to safeguard 
the interests of French and Spanish companies in these 
markets.  
As viewed by Kuhn (2011, p. 146), AFP has benefitted from 
and built upon its ‘first mover’ advantage, which allows it 
to play ‘an important substantive and symbolic role as a 
French media presence in the world of national and 
international news agencies, with a status higher than the 
was translated by PAP personnel at our request.  
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country’s economic or political importance would now 
justify’. According to a French academic interviewed for 
our study, throughout AFP’s history the French state has 
been far more committed to maintaining the agency’s 
international role than has the French press, which has 
been rather inclined to avoid the unnecessary costs of 
sustaining an expensive foreign network. 
On the domestic level, too, it is important from the state’s 
point of view that local media be able to distribute news 
from a national agency rather than from those of 
competitor countries – a point much debated in Poland 
lately. The informative function and the obligation to keep 
close track of intergovernmental affairs is clearly set out 
in the statutes of the Spanish and Polish agencies, giving 
them the double function of serving, on the one hand, the 
interests of the state and, on the other, the needs of a 
growing commercial clientele. In the case of AFP, previous 
research has also concluded that, while government 
interference seldom occurs, the quasi-public status of the 
agency may make it more inclined to take the ‘official’ view 
of what constitutes news, and therefore that drawing the 
line between ‘AFP’s professional duty as a news agency 
and its patriotic duty as the supposed “voice of France”’ 
may be difficult’ (Thogmartin, 1998, p. 153). However, the 
requirement of independence is emphasised in all three 
statutes discussed.  
State aid and EU competition rules 
While national media policies have varied both over time 
and across countries, today they are increasingly 
dependent on EU-level decisions. Most notably, the EU 
state aid rules now set the framework for state funding in 
member countries. The so-called SGEI legislation 
(services of general economic interest) is applied to 
services that are considered important to citizens or to the 
functioning of society and therefore can be funded from 
public resources.6 The recent competition rulings of the 
European Commission have been favourable for both AFP 
and EFE, and the Finnish STT is receiving a one-off subsidy 
from the government on the basis of the SGEI legislation. 
AFP 
The year 2015 saw a reform of AFP’s statute, which had 
remained largely in its original form until then despite 
some attempts at change over the years. The changes 
were necessary in order to meet the demands of the 
European Commission, which was insisting that the 
                                                        
6 According to EU competition rules, state funding for services of 
general interest cannot exceed the ‘net avoided cost’ of providing 
these services. Under this net avoided cost methodology (NACM), 
the cost of the public service obligation is calculated as the 
difference between the net cost to a company of operating an 
SGEI and the net cost to the same company of operating without 
status of AFP be brought into compliance with European 
competition rules. The Commission had opened an inquiry 
in 2010 after a now defunct German news agency, DAPD, 
complained that AFP was receiving unfair state aid. In its 
ruling of 2014, the EU Commission agreed that AFP could 
continue to receive state aid, but urged France to respect 
the European competition laws. Most importantly, 
perhaps, the Commission recognised the ‘unified nature’ 
of AFP’s activities, including the tasks attributed to it on an 
international level7 (European Commission, 2014.) The 
decision secured AFP’s public funding and ended years of 
uncertainty. However, the French state was required to 
clarify its relationship with the national news agency and 
to ensure that any aid to AFP conforms to EU rules. The 
authorisation will be reviewed again in 2025. 
Among the most important changes made to AFP’s 
statute in recent years is that a distinction is made 
between the funding of so-called ‘services of general 
interest’ and the payment for subscriptions sold on a 
commercial basis to more than 1,100 government 
departments. Following the Commission’s demand for the 
establishment of control mechanisms, a Financial 
Commission was created, which is responsible for 
ensuring that the services are not over-funded by the 
French state. The number and price of subscription 
services and the conditions under which the agency sells 
these to the state are specified in a separate subscription 
agreement. Furthermore, a Contract of Objectives and 
Means (COM) details the services of general interest, 
outlines the strategic development goals of the agency 
and sets the conditions of its financing (see e.g. Laugier, 
2017). 
According to the French draft budget law for 2018, AFP 
was to receive from the state a total of 131.5 million euros, 
of which 111.8 million euros consisted of funding for 
services of general interest and the rest of subscriptions 
(Laugier, 2017). While the state subsidy has grown slowly 
in recent years, the level of state subvention has come 
down from over 60 per cent of the agency’s revenue in the 
late 1970s (Boyd-Barret 1998, p. 25) to the current level of 
around 40 per cent. 
Some observers have voiced concerns that the French 
state is disengaging altogether from funding of AFP. 
Moreover, the vocal trade unions of AFP employees have 
fiercely criticised an amendment to the statute according 
to which the agency can now also engage in purely 
a public service obligation (European Commission, 2011). 
7 The authorisation covered the provision of so-called services of 
general interest on a global scale, ‘whatever the platform, 
language, origin or destination of the news’. 
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commercial activities, claiming that the modification has 
emptied the first two articles of AFP’s statute of their 
meaning and that the 2015 reform has stripped the 
agency of the structural independence it previously 
enjoyed (SUD-AFP, 2018).  
EFE 
Like its French competitor, the Spanish news agency, EFE, 
has also been subject to an inquiry by the European 
Commission. In 2016 the Commission gave an 
authorisation for state aid covering the period up to  
August 2027, but it urged Spain to ‘take all legislative and 
administrative measures which are necessary to make the 
existing State aid to the news agency EFE compatible with 
the Treaty’ (European Commission. 2016). 
The proposed measures included a requirement that the 
service of general interest be clearly defined and that the 
aims and obligations in fulfilment of that service and the 
basis of funding be clearly determined. According to the 
Commission’s letter to the Spanish authorities, the 
amount of funding cannot exceed what is necessary to 
cover the net cost of carrying out the public service so as 
to avoid over-compensation and cross-subsidisation.” 
Spain was also expected to ensure transparency by 
separating the accounts for commercial activities 
conducted outside the public service mandate of EFE. 
Furthermore, the Spanish state was required to ‘ensure 
that an appropriate determination of the funding needs of 
EFE on the basis of the net avoided costs model will 
exclude for the future exceptional capital injections linked 
to under-compensation’ and that the price of state 
subscriptions will be calculated on the basis of the tariff 
structure of EFE for its commercial corporate clients. 
After several postponements, the Spanish Council of 
Ministers approved a royal decree in December 2018, 
aimed at bringing the EFE law into accordance with both 
the Spanish Constitution and the directives of the 
European Union. As described earlier, the decree 
establishes the obligations associated with the agency’s 
public service function, and the methodology to determine 
the corresponding compensation. The compensation for 
carrying out public service obligations is paid annually 
from the State General Budget (PGE) and calculated 
according to a net avoided cost method, detailed in an 
annex to the decree. According to the decree, EFE must 
have a designated auditing entity as well as an analytical 
accounting system that allows the presentation of 
separate accounts of the activities subject to public 
service obligations and the rest of its activities. 
Compliance with the obligations is evaluated by a 
separate Control and Monitoring Committee, which is 
composed of a chair, who is the head of the Secretariat of 
State for Communication, and four members representing 
different ministries (BOE, 2018.) 
Between 2014 and 2017, the annual state subsidy for EFE 
had been frozen at 38–39 million euros. After the approval 
of the royal decree in 2018, the agency received an 
additional 12 million euros from the PGE (BOE, 2018), 
bringing the annual state aid to 51 million euros. The 
increase was much needed by the agency, which has been 
reporting losses for several years in a row. On one hand, it 
seems that the recent resolutions adopted by the 
European Commission have clarified the position of the 
European news agencies by recognising their role in the 
service of the public interest. At least in the case of EFE, 
the agency is expected to benefit financially from the 
status update. On the other hand, in France fears have 
been voiced that, at the next evaluation round in 2025, AFP 
may lose its unique status as established in the agency’s 
original statute. 
STT 
The instruments of SGEI legislation were also applied in 
the case of the Finnish STT which was awarded in 2018 
one-off support of 1.5 million euros under the definition of 
services of general interest (Finlex 792/2018). The aid was 
given to the financially troubled company on the condition 
that its owners be committed to the agency’s 
development and present a plan for stabilising its financial 
position. STT subsequently announced new ownership 
arrangements under which the leading media company in 
Finland, Sanoma, acquired ownership of 75 per cent of the 
company’s stock.  
While the euro sum of the state subsidy is small, it 
corresponds to more than ten per cent of STT’s revenue 
and, in the Finnish context, the decision to resort to state 
aid was a unique one and disputed within the profession 
at the highest level. Some of the owners of STT loudly 
objected to receiving subsidies, while others, including the 
executives of the company, saw it as imperative. Overall, it 
appears that the attitude towards media subsidies in 
general is more negative in Finland than in the other 
Nordic countries or elsewhere in Europe, the reasons for 
which seem to be both ideological and pragmatic. 
According to the Minister of Transport and 
Communications, Anne Berner, interviewed for our study, 
the other scenarios considered, including a capitalisation 
of the company, were quickly discarded. One of the board 
members of STT interviewed would have preferred a 
longer-term, even if smaller, state subsidy over the one-off 
support, which ‘provides a respite but does not solve 
anything’. According to Berner, however, increasing state 
subscriptions would have been hard to justify. 
It would be ill suited to Finnish culture if we bought 
unnecessary or unimportant additional services with 
tax-payers money [...] I think it is more transparent, 
honest and fair for us to clearly state that we are 
supporting a news agency which is in a bad shape, so 
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to speak, and to do this once only on the condition that 
the owners commit themselves to further 
development of the company, rather than giving 
something like disguised subsidies. (A. Berner, 
Personal interview, August 30, 2018) [our translation] 
On the other hand, some are of the opinion that the one 
million euros contract between STT and Yle, the state-
owned Finnish Public Service Broadcaster, is in effect an 
indirect subsidy to the agency. Yle started subscribing to 
STT’s services in 2017, after a ten-year break, on the 
recommendation of a parliamentary working group. 
Although the recommendation was linked to the news 
agency’s weak financial situation, according to the chair of 
the working group, member of parliament Antero Satonen, 
the fundamental goal was not to keep STT alive but 
indirectly to improve the operational conditions of regional 
newspapers, which are seen as providing an important 
counter-force to the public service broadcaster at the 
provincial level. Enhancing media pluralism is one of the 
main targets of the Finnish government’s recent media 
policy programme.  
While Yle’s editor-in-chief Jouko Jokinen, who is also a 
member of STT’s board saw opportunities to cut 
overlapping functions, another Yle insider was more 
sceptical: 
The fact is that we did not need STT's services for 
anything. [...] As for the basic news service, in 
particular, we have not recognized any need for that 
type of content. [---] In my view, it is, in practice, indirect 
state aid to STT through us, and we pay more than a 
million [euros] for services we do not need. [...] To put 
it mildly, it really gets me that one million euros gets 
wasted in this manner. (Anonymous, Personal 
interview, September 13, 2018) [our translation] 
The case of Finland, as described above, is just one 
example and no doubt similar ones could be found in other 
countries. While the direct money transfers from states to 
agencies are relatively transparent – although there is 
considerable variation between countries in this respect – 
the different forms of indirect state support can be difficult 
to conceptualise. These include different types of 
contracts and deals that may involve large sums of 
money. 
PAP 
According to a report by the Polish Sejm (lower house of 
parliament), in 2017 the direct subsidy that the agency 
received from the state budget was 8.9 million Polish 
zlotys, which is about 2.1 million euros (Sejm, 2018). 
According to an agency representative, this is paid 
retroactively after the agency has filed its report detailing 
what it has done to fulfil the ‘missions’ formulated in its 
statute. Although the share of state funding has stayed at 
the same level of around ten per cent for years, there have 
been times when the reimbursement was not made or 
was smaller than expected. In addition to its direct 
dealings with the government, PAP receives public money 
by competing for public tenders and as reimbursement for 
special projects, the total value of which is not publicly 
available. 
Political interests manifested in 
appointment procedures 
Another important area where states may exert power 
over news agencies relates to the procedures for 
appointment of their management. Over the years, there 
have been regular complaints of political interference in all 
the countries (excluding Finland) where the state is able, 
in principle, to influence the appointment or dismissal of 
the CEO and/or of board members of the agency.  
PAP 
In recent years the Polish case, most notably, has been in 
the international headlines. Shortly after its victory in the 
parliamentary election of October 2015, the Law and 
Justice (PiS) party introduced a set of reforms in various 
sectors, including the media. As part of a larger media law 
package, the 2016 Draft Act on National Media 
incorporated all state-owned media organisations, 
including the PAP and the public service media (PSM), into 
the category of ‘national media’. The draft act postulated 
a profound reform and suggested far-reaching changes to 
the formal status and governance structures of the state-
owned media as well as modifications to their mission and 
tasks. Eventually, however, the complex set of changes 
was not followed through, and the focus was placed on 
the governance of PSM (Klimkiewicz, 2017, pp. 205–206). 
The Act on the National Media Council (RMN) was passed 
in June 2016, introducing a new regulatory body, which 
now has broad authority to supervise and appoint the 
executive directors and boards of PAP and all the public 
service media in Poland. Reportedly, there is an overlap 
between the responsibilities of the RMN and of the PAP’s 
supervisory board. As formulated by one of our 
interviewees, these issues of ‘dual prominence must be 
cleared up sooner or later’. Furthermore, the members of 
the National Media Council themselves are appointed by 
the Sejm and the country’s President, and thus the 
composition of the Council strongly reflects political 
influences.  
The changes to Polish media laws have attracted strong 
criticism, particularly from the European Union, raising 
concerns related to media freedom and pluralism. In the 
Western media these media policy reforms, aimed at a ’re-
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Polonisation’ of the foreign-dominated Polish market and 
a foregrounding of patriotic values, have been framed as 
mainly conservative. In Poland, however, reactions have 
been polarised, demonstrating deeper societal divides 
between supporters and critics of the current government 
(Klimkiewicz, 2017). 
Zielonka (2015, p. 18) uses the concept of ‘business 
parallelism’ to describe how media owners are actively 
engaged in politics and in business at the same time. This 
tendency is common in new democracies. However, in 
Poland many are of the opinion that the criticism from EU 
partners is hypocritical, since the state-owned media 
under the previous government were hardly any more 
impartial, but this attracted no attention from abroad. 
According to several interviewees, the Polish public 
service media and the national news agency have always 
been good places for those in power ‘to put their friends, 
family and favourites’. Previous research confirms that 
with every change in the composition of parliament the 
composition of the management boards and the 
supervisory councils of the state-owned media companies 
has tended to change also (see e.g. Jakubowicz, 2008; 
Bajomi-Lázár, 2014; Castro Herrero et al., 2017; 
Klimkiewitz, 2017).  
On the other hand, according to our interviewees, the 
changes in legislation and governance have been 
particularly rapid in the past couple of years and the media 
policies of the ruling party have appeared to be more ad 
hoc than systematic. Strikingly, PAP has had three CEOs 
in less than a year and the management board has also 
changed twice in less than two years. In practice, the rapid 
shifts in governance have led to short-term strategies and 
hastily prepared reforms that have scarcely been 
consulted with stakeholders and experts before being 
implemented. 
EFE 
Although the Polish case has attracted exceptional 
international interest lately, the procedures for appointing 
the top executives of the agencies have long been debated 
elsewhere as well. In the case of EFE, shifts in government 
have traditionally meant changes in the agency’s 
management. The latest transfer of power, following a 
vote of no confidence in the ruling party over a corruption 
scandal in July 2018, was no exception in this respect. 
However, one of the first public statements made by EFE’s 
newly elected chair, Fernando Garea, was that his 
successor should be appointed by parliament and not by 
the government (Cortes Generales, 2018). This would be 
in line with the practice recently adopted for the national 
broadcaster, Radio Televisión Española (RTVE) and would 
provide EFE with a higher degree of non-partisan 
independence. In addition, Garea urged that EFE’s editorial 
board be brought back, recognising similar efforts made 
some years ago by the public broadcaster.  
AFP 
In AFP’s case also, the role of the state in choosing the 
chair of the company has aroused suspicion right from the 
start. The first directors-general of the agency were clearly 
political appointments. Although the agency has for 
decades generally been regarded as politically 
independent and direct government interference 
considered rare, previous research has indicated that the 
appointment of the agency’s head is always a delicate 
issue (see e.g. Huteau & Ullmann, 1992). As described by 
Thogmartin (1998, p. 155), ‘the choice of a President-
Director-General has been an unending source of political 
maneuvers and manipulations’, since the French 
government has ‘repeatedly taken the initiative in firing or 
reappointing the agency’s president, in violation of the way 
the selection was designed to work’. 
The latest election of the chair of AFP in April 2018 raised, 
once again, debate over the procedural integrity of the 
process. While the French state only controls three of the 
18 seats (excluding the chair) on AFP’s board, it has been 
considered impossible to operate without its confidence 
(see e.g. Allsop, 2018). Reportedly, the previous chair of 
the company, Emmanuel Hoog, was told by the French 
government immediately before the board was about to 
select the President-Director-General for the next five-year 
term that it would not be supporting him. Consequently, 
Fabrice Fries was left as the only candidate running for the 
post. AFP staffers called for the vote to be abandoned and 
went on strike for a short time. Three members of the 
board (the independent experts) addressed an open letter 
to the French Minister of Culture, demanding a change in 
the way the agency was governed (Cagé, Deltendre & 
Morinière, 2018). 
These recent examples from different countries 
demonstrate that intervening in the appointment 
procedures of the national news agencies may be 
tempting and appear worthwhile from the ruling political 
parties’ point of view. Although there is variation in how 
opaque or transparent these procedures are and in what 
sort of structural safeguards are provided, the current 
mechanisms clearly leave room for some sort of behind-
the-scenes political actions. 
Redefining the state relationship 
Talking about the relationship between news agencies 
and the state brings up questions of power and political 
(in)dependence. As discussed above, financial 
dependence on the state inevitably raises the question of 
whether agencies would hesitate to bite the hand that 
feeds them. However, with proper editorial firewalls and 
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structural safeguards, dependence on public funding does 
not automatically translate into direct political power over 
the agency – at least not on the level of daily practices or 
news output. 
Our interviews also indicated that state preferences have 
changed over time. While maintaining their national 
identities, in the present-day media environment agencies 
may have more value as potential tools of soft power than 
as possible propaganda arms of the political executive. In 
this respect, their growing number of commercial clients 
seems to protect the agencies against political 
interference. 
The fact is that, as we have more and more 
international customers, the state knows that if they 
ask us to write something in their interest we won't be 
credible any more for all these international clients. […] 
So, basically, they have an interest in letting us do our 
job, because their interest is in  soft power. It’s not 
telling us what we have to say, it’s having this soft 
power. In order to have this soft power we need to be 
credible, and in order to be credible we need to have no 
political intervention. […] They don’t intervene in the 
day-to-day editorial work because it is completely 
counterproductive. It would make us lose our 
credibility. (C. Buhagiar, AFP Europe director, Personal 
interview, August 23, 2018) 
Many years ago, EFE was really the way in which the 
government sent their messages. It's not happening 
any more. […] Now, the democracy, politicians know 
that it's not good to mix politics with news. […] 
Because, if it happens, the rest of the clients will say, 
"Where is the value of news that comes from a news 
agency owned by the state that is only the speaker of 
the government?" (Anonymous, Personal interview, 
September 20, 2018) 
One guarantee [of independence] is the legal 
guarantee, of course. […] Second thing, far stronger 
and far more immediate, is that the clients comment 
on my company's production on a daily basis. They 
can also command with their money. When the 
Agency loses its client, we have hardly any other 
clients to substitute this loss, because the Agency is 
the biggest player and it has almost every single news 
medium in its portfolio. It's a very short connection 
between journalistic integrity and their salary. […] If 
there is a political influence on the agency, the national 
and local media can consider cancelling their 
subscription. The Agency’s business is a guarantee of 
its journalistic independence. (P. Ambroziak, Personal 
interview, July 31, 2018)  
Similarly, previous research has concluded that, in the 
case of AFP, the agency’s competitive role as a world 
news agency may be its best defence against 
manipulation (Huteau & Ullmann, 1992, p. 142; 
Thogmartin, 1998, p. 154). On the other hand, as 
discussed above, national governments may still feel a 
temptation to interfere in management appointment 
procedures, as a way of securing their role in outlining the 
strategic objectives of the agencies. Nevertheless, as 
brought up by several of our interviewees, commercial 
owners and clients also have their own interests, and thus 
the media is never completely free of influences. In 
general, states are also more interested in the public 
service value provided by the agencies. 
As well as reasons related to safeguarding the national 
interest or linguistic policies, there are more noble, 
democratic aims at stake that are and should be in the 
state’s interest. Perhaps the most important of these is 
safeguarding the informational needs of an active 
citizenry. In the era of disinformation and fake news, the 
need for professional news institutions that provide 
accurate, fact-based, trustworthy and truthful information 
is arguably greater than ever. Therefore, against the 
background of financial turmoil in the news business, it 
may be necessary for states to implement or expand 
existing mechanisms to support high-quality news 
journalism.  
It has been claimed that a free market is likely to under-
invest in journalism (see e.g. Kind & Moen, 2014). But 
quality journalism can be considered a public good 
because of the welfare gain and the social return to 
society. Thus, it can be argued that subsidising certain 
types of content that have low consumption value but high 
information value is justified if certain preconditions are 
met. Supporting news production can be considered an 
investment in human capital, informed citizenship and the 
functioning of democracy. 
In recent years, news agencies have been going through 
difficult economic times. For decades, each of the 
agencies studied had a very clear role and place in its 
national news market. However, with digitalisation, they 
have been forced to restructure their modus operandi in 
accordance with the new media environment. Lack of 
money for future investment has been among the main 
concerns for many of the agencies struggling with a 
shrinking market (see e.g. Laville, 2010; Laugier, 2017), 
especially during and after the financial crisis. The same is 
true also for news media more generally, but, as described 
by one of our interviewees, the situation is particularly 
difficult for wholesalers of news:  
The situation is brutal in the sense that the economic 
value of news is almost zero for the time being.  No 
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one is making money from news. It's two seconds, and 
the news item is everybody’s property. However, news 
can be used as bait to get people onto your site, and 
then you offer something else to keep them there. But 
the news itself… it has no economic value. So it's 
logical that the wholesaler of news will lose its 
business. Digitalisation has brought us here. You get 
along if you wrap them up, but STT can’t do that. So, 
the situation is really bad. This leads you to think about 
whether society should support this sort of activities. 
(Jouko Jokinen, editor-in-chief, Finnish broadcasting 
company Yle, Personal interview, September 27, 2018) 
[our translation] 
While some European agencies have been affected more 
than others, the most profitable parts of the business 
seem to be based on new, innovative ideas on the 
periphery of the traditional news business. From the 
democratic point of view, however, the basic news 
services are the most valuable part of news agency 
business. Assuming that the social value of these services 
is much greater than their economic value to their owners, 
this brings forward the question of whether the state 
should offer better support for financing the services that 
are important for an active and informed citizenry.  
Although national news agencies are certainly not the only 
source of quality news, from the public support point of 
view they have the advantage of serving the whole media 
field. Thus, subsidising them has also been argued for on 
grounds of promoting media pluralism, as in the Finnish 
case discussed above. Also, in the light of studies of trust 
in the media, European news agencies are in general 
trusted institutions that have strong brands, although in 
some cases their actual influence may be shrinking.  
The revenues of traditional wires are in decline. Still, 
the wire is the source of prestige and renown for the 
Agency and we are trying to build on this. […] Maybe 
this type of news business is out of a market anyway. 
Twitter kills us in speed, in variety, accessibility. The 
only currency that we have left is credibility and we are 
trying to build on this. Everything else […] can be done 
faster, better, cheaper, differently, except for credibility. 
And credibility comes from years of hard work. […] The 
fee for the licensed service is only partially a fee for our 
content. The other part is the insurance premium. (P. 
Ambroziak, Personal interview, July 31, 2018) 
Although the very existence of national news agencies – 
some of which have existed for more than a hundred years 
– may be regarded as an intrinsic value, a key question is 
obviously that of whether or not they have become 
outdated institutions that have already reached the end of 
the road. From a democracy perspective, the value of 
these agencies depends on their capacity to respond to 
the changing needs of society. The need for state support 
must be addressed by individual states on the basis of a 
clear identification of this need. On a significant level, 
though, the possibility of state intervention for the benefit 
of democracy must be recognised. 
Some European countries have a long history of 
supporting their national news agencies – for reasons 
ranging from preserving the objectives of authoritarian 
leaders or national interests to informing and empowering 
the public. AFP and EFE, for example, have been 
dependent on the state throughout their existence and 
would not have been able to maintain their costly 
international networks unless they were receiving a 
substantial state subsidy. In other countries, the news 
agencies have operated purely on a commercial basis. 
However, EU rules for state aid now set the framework for 
state funding in all member countries.  
In order to clarify the status of the European national news 
agencies, it would be a step forward if the EU, instead of 
dealing on a country-and-case basis, would agree that the 
European news agencies as a whole provide public 
services that are valuable to the democratic, social and 
cultural needs of each society. Then they could be eligible 
for public subsidies on similar grounds to those applied in 
the Amsterdam Treaty to public service broadcasting. A 
broader definition of public service could include all media 
providing reliable, truthful and fact-based news.  
Nevertheless, we do not wish to argue for policies that 
appear conservative or protectionist or only aim to 
support a declining industry by replacing a reduced market 
income with public funds (cf. Picard, 2007, 2013). Also, 
there is a benefit to democracy only if the providers of 
subsidised services are independent and not guided by 
any external interests. Therefore, calls for state 
intervention must be accompanied by mechanisms for 
assessing the value of national news agencies to society, 
complemented by strict regulations on firewalls that 
effectively guarantee their autonomy from any outside 
interference, either political or commercial. 
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